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Environmental Sampling for 
Spores of Bacillus anthracis
Eyasu H. Teshale,*† John Painter,* Gregory A. Burr,‡ Paul Mead,* Scott V. Wright,*† 
Larry F. Cseh,*† Ronald Zabrocki,*† Rick Collins,*† Kathy A. Kelley,§ James L. Hadler,§ 
David L. Swerdlow,* and members of the Connecticut Anthrax Response Team1
On November 11, 2001, following the bioterrorism-related anthrax attacks, the U.S. Postal Service col-
lected samples at the Southern Connecticut Processing and Distribution Center; all samples were nega-
tive for Bacillus anthracis. After a patient in Connecticut died from inhalational anthrax on November 19,
the center was sampled again on November 21 and 25 by using dry and wet swabs. All samples were
again negative for B. anthracis. On November 28, guided by information from epidemiologic investigation,
we sampled the site extensively with wet wipes and surface vacuum sock samples (using HEPA vacuum).
Of 212 samples, 6 (3%) were positive, including one from a highly contaminated sorter. Subsequently B.
anthracis was also detected in mail-sorting bins used for the patient’s carrier route. These results suggest
cross-contaminated mail as a possible source of anthrax for the inhalational anthrax patient in Connecti-
cut. In future such investigations, extensive sampling guided by epidemiologic data is imperative.
ollowing the bioterrorism-related anthrax attacks in Octo-
ber 2001, a total of 22 cases of anthrax were identified: 11
confirmed cases of inhalational anthrax, and 11 (7 confirmed
and 4 suspected) cases of cutaneous anthrax (1). Epidemio-
logic investigation of the first nine patients with inhalational
anthrax showed that they were exposed to particulate aerosols
containing  Bacillus anthracis when they opened letters or
when letters were processed in postal facilities (2).
The final case of inhalational anthrax in 2001, reported on
November 19, was in a 94-year-old woman from Oxford, Con-
necticut, who died (3).  Unlike previous cases, the patient was
not a postal employee, mail handler, media worker, or govern-
ment official (1,2). An extensive investigation for B. anthracis
spores was conducted at her home and other places that she
visited in the 2 months preceding her death; all samples were
negative (4). Retrospective and prospective surveillance
detected no additional cases of anthrax in her community
(5,6), and an intentional release of anthrax spores there was
considered unlikely. The investigation focused on mail as the
source of anthrax; we subsequently conducted intensive sam-
pling of the postal facility that serves her region. We describe
the sampling methods, results, and public health implications
of repeated environmental sampling in this facility. 
The Setting
The regional postal processing center for the patient is the
Southern Connecticut Processing and Distribution Center
(SCPDC) in Wallingford. With a floor area of 350,000 square
feet and the capacity to process up to 3 million pieces of mail a
day, the center is in operation around the clock.  In November
2001, SCPDC employed 1,122 workers. 
The center is equipped with 6 advanced-facer canceller
machines, 5 optical character reader machines, 5 bar-code sort-
ing machines, and 13 digital bar-code sorting (DBCS) machines
for processing letters. In addition, automated flat sorting
machines, linear integrated parcel sorters, and small bundle and
parcel sorters are used to process flats (large flat pieces of mail
that are not packages) and parcels (wrapped packages).
Although all these machines are part of the facility, they differ in
function, speed of processing, and location within the facility. 
Mail Processing
The advanced facer-canceller machines cancel letters orig-
inating from southern Connecticut and apply two bar codes
that are used to identify and sort letters for their final destina-
tion. The identification tag, a fluorescent orange bar code on
the back of the envelope, records the time and date that the let-
ter was canceled. The postnet barcode, a series of vertical full
and half bars applied to the front of an envelope, contains zip
code and delivery point information in machine-readable for-
mat. Advanced facer-canceller machines are used primarily to
process stamped mail; bulk letters are not processed on cancel-
ing machines because they already have barcodes applied by
the mailers and are presorted. 
The high-speed computerized DBCS machines are used
for preliminary and final sorting of the mail by barcode. Dur-
ing the preliminary sort, letters can be processed on any one of
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the 13 DBCS machines at the facility. This step arranges the
letters by the 5-digit zip code of the delivery address, usually
requiring <2 passes to sort a batch of mail. Once this step is
accomplished, mail is transported for final processing to a des-
ignated DBCS machine, which sorts the letters to the 9- or 11-
digit zip code, usually requiring <3 passes. Therefore, letters
addressed to the patient could have been processed initially on
any of the 13 DBCS machines.  Later, the final sort would
have been processed on DBCS no. 6, where specific bins were
designated for the carrier route.
In October and November 2001, independent contractors
working for the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) tested postal pro-
cessing and distribution plants nationwide to determine if any
had become contaminated with B. anthracis following the bio-
terrorism events. As part of this effort, SCPDC was tested on
November 11, 2001; all results were negative for B. anthracis
contamination. Following the report of the inhalational anthrax
case in Oxford, Connecticut, the facility was tested again
extensively.
Methods
Samples were obtained from SCPDC on November 11, 21,
25, and 28 and December 2. Sampling methods included dry
swabs, wet swabs, wet wipes, and HEPA vacuum. 
On November 11, a contracting company working for
USPS obtained samples from SCPDC as part of the nation-
wide testing of postal facilities for anthrax spores. The con-
tractor took dry synthetic swabs from random sites in the
facility and sent them to be analyzed at the Connecticut
Department of Public Health Laboratory. On November 21,
2001, after the report of the 94-year-old woman with anthrax
in Connecticut, a second independent contractor hired by
USPS collected additional dry swab samples from surfaces
where letters, flats, and parcels were processed. These sam-
ples, along with others collected from air circulating units,
were analyzed by the Connecticut Department of Public
Health Laboratory.
On November 25, the investigation team obtained samples
from the facility using wet synthetic swabs and processed
them by methods recommended by CDC (7,8). Samples were
taken from the letter canceling and sorting machines, flat and
parcel sorting machines, and five facility vacuum filters in use
since October 27, 2001. The samples were analyzed by the
Connecticut Department of Public Health Laboratory. 
Samples taken on November 28 were more extensive.
Guided by additional epidemiologic data, we collected sam-
ples from carefully selected sites (the canceling and sorting
machines) by using wet synthetic 2x2-inch wipes and HEPA
vacuum. Specimens were collected and transported according
to recommended methods (7,8). Wipe and vacuum samples
were cultured and analyzed at a CDC-contracted laboratory. 
On December 2, following the first report of anthrax-posi-
tive results in the facility, we collected follow-up samples. A
composite sample from the vertical column of four bins was
taken from all columns on the four DBCS machines that were
presumptively positive based on sampling done on November
28. These wet wipe samples, taken to determine the extent of
contamination on the machines, were analyzed by a CDC-con-
tracted laboratory. 
Results
A total of 589 samples were collected from November 11
to December 2, 2001. Three hundred forty-six (59%) of these
were from the DBCS machines. Of the 589 samples, 117
(20%) were dry swabs, 60 (10%) wet swabs, 300 (51%) wet
wipes, and 112 (19%) HEPA vacuum samples. 
Fifty-three dry synthetic swab samples were taken on
November 11. Of these, only one (2%) sample was from a
DBCS machine (no. 6). All samples were negative for B.
anthracis (Tables 1,2).
On November 21, 64 dry synthetic swab samples were
taken. Of these, six (10%) were from the DBCS machines, two
each from DBCS nos. 5, 6, and 7. All samples were negative
for B. anthracis (Tables 1,2).
On November 25, the investigation team took a total of 60
wet synthetic swab samples; 8 (13%) were from the DBCS
machines. Of the eight samples taken from the DBCS
machines, one sample each was taken from DBCS nos. 1, 2, 9,
11, and 13 and three from DBCS no. 6. All samples were neg-
ative for B. anthracis (Tables 1,2).
On November 28, the most extensive sampling was con-
ducted, with 212 samples collected. Of these, 102 (48%) were
wet wipes and 110 (52%) vacuum samples. We used wet wipes
for sampling the stacker bins (hard surfaces) and the HEPA
vacuum for sampling the machines, including the inaccessible
parts. We focused our sample collection on machines likely to
have processed mail delivered to the patient's address.
Although all machines were tested, 131 (62%) samples were
from DBCS machines, which processed both stamped mail
and nearly all the bulk presorted mail; approximately 80% of
the mail recovered from the patient's home was bulk mail.
Of 212 samples, 6 (3%) yielded B. anthracis, and all posi-
tive samples were from DBCS machines. Of the six anthrax-
positive samples, two were vacuum samples from DBCS nos.
4 and 10, and four were wet wipe samples from the bins of
DBCS machines nos. 10 and 11. One vacuum sample (0.55 g
of specimen) from the feeder part of machine no. 10 had
2.9x106 CFU of B. anthracis, equal to 5.5x106 CFU of B.
anthracis per gram of sample material. Of the mail sorted on
this machine, approximately 75% is bulk mail. This machine
had not been sampled before November 28, the fourth round of
sampling.
Following the results of the sampling on November 28, we
collected follow-up samples on December 2. We took samples
to determine the extent of contamination on DBCS machines
nos. 4, 10, and 11, the machines from which results were posi-
tive for B. anthracis on the November 28 sampling. In addi-
tion, we also collected samples from DBCS machine no. 6
because preliminary positive results from the November 28
sampling were reported and because this machine was used forEmerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2002 1085
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final processing of mail to the address of the patient. The 200
wet wipe samples taken on December 2 were composite wipes
from a vertical column of four bins from each machine (each
machine has 48–52 columns of four bins). We collected com-
posite samples to allow complete sampling of all bins from all
suspect machines without taking an excessive number of sam-
ples (Table 2).
Of 200 composite column samples from DBCS machines
nos. 4, 6, 10, and 11, a total of 35 (17.5%) columns of bins
were positive. On machine no. 10, 30 (68%) of 52 columns
were positive. Three (6%) of 52 columns from machine no. 11
and 1 (2%) of 48 columns on both machines no. 4 and 6 were
positive. These results confirmed the high contamination of
machine no. 10. Only 1 of 48 columns of bins on machine no.
6 was found to be positive. Machine no. 6 was used for final
mail sorting for several zip codes including the town where the
patient lived. The only column of bins that yielded B. anthra-
cis on DBCS no. 6 included bins for the carrier route for the
patient’s home. 
Discussion
Supplemented by the findings of the epidemiologic inves-
tigation team, our investigation identified cross-contaminated
mail as a possible source of anthrax for the Connecticut patient
(4). No other source of contamination in her community was
identified after extensive sampling of her home and areas she
visited; no other cases of anthrax were reported. We identified
a contaminated sorting machine that was used to sort most of
the mail delivered to the patient, including bulk mail; the spe-
cific column of bins that held mail for her carrier route was
positive (4). Extensive sampling with large numbers of sam-
ples was required to find anthrax spores. Positive results were
obtained following sample collection based on information
learned during the epidemiologic investigation. All positive
results were obtained from samples collected by using wet
wipes and vacuum sampling. All the dry or wet swab samples
were negative for B. anthracis. 
Environmental sampling during an anthrax investigation is
critical in determining the likely source of infection and the
extent and degree of environmental contamination, to support
decisions on the need for prophylaxis with antibiotics or clean-
up, and to provide guidance about when clean-up is adequate
to permit reentry into an area. During this investigation, no
validated methods for specifically sampling the environment
for B. anthracis were known. We lacked data on the effective-
ness of the sample collection media (swabs, wipes, and vac-
uum) for typical porous and nonporous surfaces encountered
in indoor environments. The effect of varying concentrations
of B. anthracis–containing particles and dust loading on sam-
pling efficiency had also not been studied. Furthermore, recov-
ery efficiency of the analytical methods (efficiency of removal
of B. anthracis spores from the sample collection media) had
not been adequately evaluated, and limits of detection have not
been established (8).
Although our investigation showed that different sample
collection techniques and sampling sites and numbers of sam-
ples yielded different findings, results are based on observa-
tion and cannot be used to specifically compare the different
approaches. However, exploring the reasons for the different
results may be useful for future investigations. On November
11, all samples were collected by using dry swabs from ran-
dom sites in the facility with the intent of finding contamina-
tion anywhere in the facility. Only one sample from the DBCS
machines was taken. On November 21, more samples were
taken from the DBCS machines, but still only three machines
were sampled. This sampling was performed with emphasis on
the Oxford mail route because the illness had been reported in
that community. However, whether the patient’s mail was pre-
dominantly bulk mail and whether letters could have been
sorted preliminarily on any DBCS machine were not known at
the time. The November 25 sampling was similar to the
November 21 sampling except that investigators used wet
swabs instead of dry swabs. Again, limited samples from six
DBCS machines were taken. 
On November 28, more extensive and directed sampling
was conducted, and epidemiologic information was available
to guide us to the appropriate sites.  Using wet wipes and
HEPA vacuum led to the first positive results for anthrax in the
facility. A recent study, conducted after the Connecticut inves-
tigation, has confirmed our findings (WT Sanderson et al.,
unpub. data). In this study, side-by-side surface swabs, wipes,
and HEPA vacuum samples were taken at the Brentwood Pro-
cessing and Distribution Center in Washington, D.C., to com-
pare their relative effectiveness in a contaminated postal
facility. Wet wipes and vacuum sampling were found to be
Table 1. Number of samples taken from digital bar-code sorting 
machines during five sampling dates, Connecticut, 2001
Machine 
no. 11/11/01  11/21/01 11/25/01 11/28/01 12/02/01
Total 
samples
11 8 9
21 8 9
38 8
41 1 a 48 a 59
5 2 12 14
6 123 2 3 4 8  a 77
7 2 12 14
88 8
91 8 9
10 8b 52c 60
11 1 8 a 52d 61
12 8 8
13 1 8 9
Total 1 6 8 130 200 345
aOne positive sample.
bFour positive samples.
cThirty positive samples.
dThree positive samples.BIOTERRORISM-RELATED ANTHRAX
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more effective methods than surface swabs; results from wet
wipes and vacuum samples were highly concordant. Of 28
sample locations tested, 4 (13%) were positive with dry swabs,
compared with 13 (46%) wet swabs, 23 (82%) wet wipes, and
23 (82%) vacuum samples (WT Sanderson et al., unpub. data).
Although the effectiveness of sampling techniques influ-
ences which are used, other factors that determine the choice
of sampling techniques include the site of sampling, size of the
surface to be sampled, character of the surface (porous or non-
porous), need to quantify the results, and preference and spe-
cialization of the laboratory where the test is done. Swab
samples may still be the best method to sample small hard sur-
faces not easily accessible for wiping or vacuum sampling
(e.g., a keyboard). Surface wipes also have several limitations
(8). Wipe samples might miss minimally contaminated sur-
faces or small, discrete contaminated areas.  In addition, sam-
pling all surfaces within a building by using surface wipes is
not feasible. Therefore, vacuum samples provide an important
tool for maximizing the surfaces that can be evaluated during
an investigation (8).
Sampling methods and number of samples are also influ-
enced by the circumstances of the potential contamination. A
sufficient number of samples must be taken to increase the
probability that the sampling is representative, given the likely
extent of contamination. In an initial investigation where a
known or suspected release of potentially contaminated mate-
rial has occurred, the first priority should be to collect samples
near the suspected release source (often called directed or tar-
geted sampling). In determining the extent of contamination,
investigators should include coverage of areas along an antici-
pated contaminant pathway, i.e., those associated with air
movement or dust collection, as well as activities that result in
re-aerosolization or cross-contamination. 
When sampling to identify contamination in a facility, the
length of time between the suspected contamination of the
facility and the time that sampling occurs is also important in
determining where and how to collect samples. For example,
since the sampling on November 11 was conducted >3 weeks
after contamination was probably introduced into the facility,
any aerosolized spores of B. anthracis had likely already set-
tled on surfaces, and therefore surface sampling, as opposed to
air sampling, was reasonable. 
The environmental investigation did not identify anthrax
spores in the patient’s home, possibly because her house was
routinely cleaned thoroughly or because the piece of mail that
was the source for her infection was not identified. One resi-
dent of her community is known to have received an envelope
from which B. anthracis spores were isolated that was likely to
have become cross-contaminated as it passed through the
postal system, although no one in that household became ill
(2). The patient also probably became ill following exposure
to a low number of B. anthracis spores, which may explain
why she had a relatively long incubation period compared with
the other cases reported (9,10). Other host factors, including
advanced age, underlying lung disease, medication use (2),
and the practice of tearing up bulk mail (4), may have
increased her chances of acquiring the disease.
The results of our investigation influenced the adherence
and compliance of postal workers on postexposure prophy-
laxis at SCPDC. A study conducted there showed that 13% of
the postal workers stopped taking postexposure prophylaxis
because of the initial report of negative environmental cultures
in the facility. An increase in postexposure prophylaxis adher-
ence occurred, however, following the positive results in the
facility (11).
The reasons why no postal workers at SCPDC became ill
during this event are unknown. Perhaps host factors were
important or anthrax spores were not aerosolized in sufficient
concentration. The finding that spores were not widespread in
the facility suggests that the dispersion was likely not due to
substantial aerosolization. Following the experience from the
Brentwood facility in October 2001, cleaning practices in
postal facilities nationwide changed from use of compressed
air, which easily aerosolized small particulate materials such
as anthrax spores, to use of HEPA vacuums for cleaning (12).
At SCPDC, maintenance workers stopped using forced air to
clean equipment on October 27, 2001, which may have
reduced the time when spores could have been aerosolized.
The highly contaminated DBCS machine could have been a
source of exposure to postal workers if the cleaning measures
had not been changed.
The environmental investigation was central in demon-
strating a possible source of infection for the case of inhala-
tional anthrax in Connecticut. Our investigation showed that
Table 2. Environmental sampling methods, types, and results of samples taken November 11–December 2, Southern Connecticut Processing 
and Distribution Center, 2001a
Sampling date No. of samples Samples from DBCS Type  Positive results Sample collectors
11/11/01 53 1 Dry swabs 0 USPS
11/21/01 64 6 Dry swabs 0 USPS
11/25/01 60 8 Wet swabs 0 CDC/ATSDR
11/28/01 212 131 Wet wipes and vacuum 6 CDC/ATSDR
12/02/01 200 200 Wet wipes 35 CDC/ATSDR
Total 589 346 41
aDBCS, digital bar-code sorting; USPS, United States Postal Service; CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; ATSDR, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2002 1087
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extensive sampling was required and that epidemiologic inves-
tigation was essential in identifying sites for sampling. None
of the dry or wet swab samples were positive. For future inves-
tigations of large facilities, we recommend the use of wet
wipes and vacuum. Further research is needed to clarify the
sensitivity of the sampling and analytical methods for known
or suspected B. anthracis and to develop clear algorithms for
sampling if future investigations are needed. This investigation
also demonstrated that illness associated with cross-contami-
nated mail is a rare but possible phenomenon.
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